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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 02-3520

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ALPHONSO L. MACON, JR.,
Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 99-cr-00126)
District Judge: Hon. Sylvia H. Rambo

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 8, 2004
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, and OBERDORFER, District Judge*
(Filed March 17, 2004)

OPINION OF THE COURT

*

Hon. Louis F. Oberdorfer, Senior District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
Before us is the appeal of Alphonso L. Macon from the decision of the District
Court denying Macon’s motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
I.
Background
A grand jury indicted Macon for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count One), and with carrying a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c) (Count Three). In August, 1999, Macon pled guilty to Count One. In exchange
for Macon’s plea, the Government agreed, among other things, to move for dismissal of
any remaining counts at sentencing and to recommend that the quantity of cocaine and
cocaine base attributed to Macon be more than five (5) grams but less than fifty (50)
grams. The Government also agreed to recommend a three-point reduction in Macon’s
offense level “if the defendant can adequately demonstrate [his] acceptance of
responsibility to the government.”
Overruling Macon’s objections to the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), the District
Court denied Macon a reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility, found
the drug quantity attributable to him to be in excess of 50 grams of cocaine and cocaine
base, adjudicated him as a career offender, and sentenced him, inter alia, to 360 months
in prison. At a re-sentencing pursuant to Rule 35(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the District Court corrected its findings regarding the career offender
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enhancement, granted a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 because
Macon’s prior convictions overstated the seriousness of his criminal history, and
sentenced Macon to 210 months in prison, with a fine of $1500, a $100 special
assessment, and five years of supervised release. This Court affirmed. United States v.
Macon, 234 F.3d 1266 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1173 (2001).
Macon raised four ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his timely filed §
2255 motion. The District Court denied relief on the merits. Specifically with regard to
Macon’s first claim, the District Court held that appellate counsel was not ineffective in
failing to claim that the Government breached the plea agreement when it failed to
recommend a reduction in offense level for Macon’s acceptance of responsibility. App.
at 122-124. The District Court found that the Government’s obligation to recommend
such a reduction was contingent on Macon’s demonstration of acceptance of
responsibility to the Government’s satisfaction, and thus it was not unconditional. App.
at 124. Nevertheless, the District Court granted a certificate of appealability on this issue;
the District Court denied a certificate of appealability on the remaining claims. Macon
timely appealed and counsel was duly appointed. We permitted Macon to file a pro se
brief in which he has raised the ineffective counsel claims on which the District Court
denied a certificate of appealability.1 We will address Macon’s counseled brief as well as
the arguments raised in his pro se brief.
1

We will construe the pro se brief as Macon’s request for a certificate of
appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
3

II.
Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and this Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291. As to the issue on which the District Court
granted a certificate of appealability, we exercise plenary review over the District Court’s
legal conclusions and review any factual findings for clear error. As for Macon’s appeal
of the District Court’s denial of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in his
pro se brief, an appeal may not be taken unless this Court first issues a certificate of
appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A certificate of appealability may issue only if
Macon has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S.
Ct. 1029, 1039-40 (2003). Macon must show that “reasonable jurists would find the
district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529
U.S. at 484; Miller-El, 123 S. Ct. at 1039-40.
III.
Discussion
All of M acon’s claims concern the ineffectiveness of trial and appellate counsel.
Ineffectiveness of counsel must be measured by the standard enunciated in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Macon must show that his attorney’s performance was
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, and prejudice as a result thereof. Id.
Where the collateral challenge is to a plea of guilty rather than a trial verdict, Macon must
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show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not
have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
58-59 (1985).
A.
We first address Macon’s ineffective-counsel claim with respect to the
Government’s failure to recommend a three-point reduction in offense level for
acceptance of responsibility. Relying on United States v. Gomez, 271 F.3d 770 (8 th Cir.
2001), Macon argues that the plea agreement entitled him to the Government’s
recommendation, that the Government breached the plea agreement when it failed to
make the required recommendation, and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise the breach issue on appeal. We disagree.
Plea agreements are contractual in nature and are measured by contract law
standards. United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir. 1998). “Because
the defendant, by entering into the plea, surrenders a number of h[is] constitutional rights,
courts are compelled to scrutinize closely the promise made by the government in order to
determine whether it has been performed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “‘In
view of the government’s tremendous bargaining power, we will strictly construe the text
against it’ as the drafter of plea agreements to the extent the agreement is ambiguous.”
United States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Baird,
218 F.3d 221, 229) (3d Cir. 2000)). In this case, the language of the agreement is

5

perfectly clear.
The dispute on appeal centers on Paragraph 10 of the plea agreement, which
provides in pertinent part, “if the defendant can adequately demonstrate this acceptance of
responsibility to the government, the United States Attorney will [ ] recommend that the
defendant receive a three-point reduction in the defendant’s offense level for acceptance
of responsibility.” App. at 21. Unlike the unconditional “entitlement” language
contained in the plea agreement in Gomez, see 271 F.3d at 780 & 781, the Government
only agreed in M acon’s case to recommend a reduction for acceptance of responsibility
upon Macon’s adequate showing that he accepted responsibility. Indeed, the parties
acknowledged as much when they agreed that Macon “will clearly demonstrate a
recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility as required by the sentencing
guidelines.” App. at 21. Thus, although the agreement was predicated on the assumption
that Macon would make the requisite showing, the Government’s obligation to
recommend a three-point reduction was contingent on Macon’s actual demonstration of
acceptance of responsibility in accordance with the sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.G. §
3E1.1. The Probation Office determined that a reduction in offense level was not
warranted because M acon failed to acknowledge his source of drugs and his culpability in
the drug offense, and he initially twice denied writing a letter to his co-defendant
cautioning her not to reveal anything about his activities to federal investigators. The
Government apparently relied on the determination that Macon had failed to accept
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responsibility in deciding not to recommend the three-point reduction. Pursuant to the
language of the agreement, Macon’s failure to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility
obviated the Government’s obligation to recommend the three-point reduction. Because
the Government was not obliged to make the recommendation, it did not breach the plea
agreement when it failed to do so. Moreover, because this issue was not meritorious,
appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it. Accordingly, we will affirm
the District Court’s denial of relief.
B.
We now turn to Macon’s pro se claims.2 Macon contends that (1) plea counsel
erroneously advised him that his minimum/maximum sentence under the sentencing
guidelines would be 100-125 months of imprisonment without considering or advising
Macon of a two-level increase for possession of a firearm and of Macon’s career offender
status; (2) plea counsel and appellate counsel failed to challenge the District Court’s
failure to inform Macon of the nature of the charges and their elements, in violation of
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1); and (3) plea counsel and appellate counsel failed to claim that
the District Court’s erred in imposing a fine without first determining M acon’s ability to
pay. For the following reasons, we deny a certificate of appealability.
First, as for Macon’s claim that plea counsel erroneously gave him an inaccurate
estimation of the minimum/maximum sentence Macon would receive under the
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Macon’s counsel and the Government briefed these claims as well.
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sentencing guidelines, we have long held that an erroneous sentencing prediction by
counsel does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel where an adequate plea
hearing was conducted. United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 2003);
Masciola v. United States, 469 F.2d 1057, 1059 (3d Cir. 1972). After receiving
assurances from M acon that his plea was not coerced or involuntary, the District Court
properly advised Macon of the minimum/maximum imprisonment range for the offense to
which he pled guilty and of the role of the Sentencing Guidelines:
THE COURT: Has anyone promised you what your sentence would be?
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am.
THE COURT: In that regard, do you understand that depending upon the
amount of drugs that his Court determines that you are involved with, you
could either have a maximum penalty of 40 years in prison or life
depending on the amount, a fine of $2 million or $4 million depending on
the amount, whether it’s more than 50 grams?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes ma’am.
THE COURT: If the Court determines it’s 50 grams or less, you would
have a mandatory minimum of 5 years in prison. If it’s more than 50 grams,
you would have a mandatory minimum of 10 years. Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Also you would be subject to a term of supervised release,
costs of prosecution, denial of certain federal benefits and a special
assessment of $100. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Do you understand that there are sentencing guidelines that
8

this Court must follow, and that I cannot depart from these guidelines
except under special circumstances? Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
App. at 40-41. Based on the adequacy of the foregoing plea colloquy, and the lack of any
allegation of prosecutorial involvement, we can only conclude that counsel’s alleged
erroneous sentencing prediction was simply that, a prediction, and as such, it did not
amount to ineffective assistance.
Macon argues that the District Court erred in denying the claim without holding an
evidentiary hearing on plea counsel’s failure to advise Macon of the impact at sentencing
of his career offender status and gun possession. A court must order an evidentiary
hearing unless the motion and files and records of the case show conclusively that the
prisoner is not entitled to relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Here, no hearing was warranted
because the record showed conclusively that Macon was not entitled to relief. Macon
explicitly acknowledged at the plea colloquy that he could be sentenced to a minimum of
5 years and to a maximum of life in prison depending on the amount of drugs attributable
to him. Therefore he knew the length of his potential sentence. Accordingly, counsel’s
alleged failure to advise him of the impact of career offender status and the two-point
increase in offense level for gun possession during the commission of the offense could
not have been prejudicial because the impact on sentencing would have been the same.
Simply put, counsel was not ineffective because M acon was fully aware that counsel’s
estimates regarding the length of sentence were merely predictions based on information
9

available to counsel at the time. See Masciola, 469 F.2d at 1059. Macon’s reliance on
United States v. McCoy, 215 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2000), is misplaced. In McCoy, plea
counsel’s miscalculation of the applicable sentencing range was reinforced by the
prosecutor. More importantly, the court never informed McCoy of the maximum
statutory penalty. These facts are not present here.
The District Court also rejected Macon’s ineffective-counsel claim regarding the
Court’s alleged failure to “address the defendant personally in open court and inform the
defendant of, and determine that the defendant understand . . . the nature of the charge to
which the plea is offered . . . .” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1). In simple cases such as
Macon’s, the Rule 11 mandate “does not preclude an explanation by reading the
indictment.” Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 414 (3d Cir. 1973); see also United
States v. Syal, 963 F.2d 900, 904-05 (6 th Cir. 1992). Here, the District Court complied
with Rule 11(c)(1) by reading Count One of the indictment to Macon before the
Government set forth the factual basis for the plea. Macon replied in the negative when
asked if he had any questions about the charge to which he was pleading guilty. In light
of the Court’s substantial compliance with Rule 11, neither plea counsel nor appellate
counsel was ineffective for failing to object at the plea hearing or failing to raise such an
issue on appeal.
Macon’s final ineffectiveness claim concerns counsel’s failure to challenge the
District Court’s imposition of a fine absent explicit findings on ability to pay. The
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sentencing record shows, however, that the District Court adopted the determinations of
the Probation Office, namely that Macon had no assets or liabilities, no credit history, and
no record of filing tax returns, and it imposed a fine below the guideline range because of
Macon’s inability to pay. App. at 78 & 89. Macon’s claim, therefore, is without merit
because the District Court in effect made the necessary findings.
IV.
Conclusion
The judgment of the District Court denying Macon’s ineffectiveness claim
regarding the Government’s alleged failure to recommend a reduction in offense level for
acceptance of responsibility will be affirmed. We deny a certificate of appealability on
the remaining claims because Macon has failed to make a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.

